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´&RPSHWLQJRQWKH,VVXHV+RZH[SHULHQFHLQJRYHUQPHQWDQGHFRQRPLFFRQGLWLRQV
LQIOXHQFHWKHVFRSHRISDUWLHV·SROLF\PHVVDJHµ 
 
 
Parties campaign on a range of topics to attract diverse support. Little research, 
however, looks at why parties narrow or expand the scope of their campaign or shift 
attention across issues. Focusing only on a single dimension or topic may lead scholars 
to miss-estimate the magnitude of the HIIHFWRISDUWLHV·H[SHULHQFHVLQJRYHUQPHQWRU
economic context. I propose that electoral conditions influence the scope of parties' 
manifestos. I test hypotheses using a measure of issue diversity: the Effective Number 
of Manifesto Issues (ENMI). Based on analysis of 1662 manifestos in 24 OECD countries 
from 1951 to 2010, the results support the theory. Government parties have higher 
ENMI. Opposition parties and governments expecting a reward for the economy limit 
their issue appeals. Tests of the underlying mechanism using data on issue dimensions 
and policy data provide additional support. These findings have important implications 
for the study of election strategy and democratic accountability.  
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2 
 
Statements of party preferences and issue priorities form a central component of 
electoral campaigns. Parties use multiple strategies to sculpt their policy messages. 
Parties shift the location of their preferences (Adams and Somer-Topçu 2009) and seek 
to influence the issues that dominate the agenda by emphasizing certain issues, such as 
unemployment, education, or the environment (Petrocik 1996; Bélanger and Meguid 
2008; Green and Hobolt 2008; Green 2011; Hellwig 2012). Parties try to develop 
¶ownership· over issues by convincing voters that they are competent organizations in 
government (e.g. Green and Jennings 2011a; Wagner and Meyer 2014). Likewise, they 
respond to electoral losses by acting as entrepreneurs and addressing issues on 
alternative political dimensions (de Vries and Hobolt 2012).  
Despite our knowledge of competition on specific issues, we know little about 
why parties choose to compete on a large range of issues or focus their policy message 
to a smaller number. Little research investigates the factors that influence the scope of 
SDUWLHV·campaigns. When do parties increase or decrease their attention on a range of 
issues? A comprehensive theory must account for the composition of SDUWLHV· campaign 
messages in addition to the specific topics and the ideological dimensions parties 
address.  
Most issue competition theories do not directly explain the diversity of issues in 
party manifestos. Take for example, the 1997 elections in France. Faced with a snap 
election and a mediocre economy, the two coalition parties created a joint election 
PDQLIHVWRWKDWZDVDVKLIWIURPWKHLUSUHYLRXVSROLF\VWDWHPHQWV´$7RXJK7LPHIRUDQ
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ElHFWLRQµDOWKRXJKWKHFRPELQHGPDQLIHVWRIRUWKHRassemblement pour le 
Republique (RPR) and the Union pour la Démocratie Française (UDF) moved their policy 
statements closer toward the Parti Socialiste (PS), it also decreased the range of issues 
addrHVVHGLQWKH535·VPDQLIHVWREXWLQFUHDVHGWKHUDQJHIRUWKH8')7KHWRWDO
number of issues in their 1997 platform remained quite high and included discussion of 
WKHJRYHUQPHQW·VSULRULW\IRUSROLF\RQLVVXHVWKHJRYHUQPHQWDGGUHVVHGVXFKDV
foreign policy and the European Community.1 The largest opposition parties, the PS 
and the Parti Communiste (PCF), moderated their proposals and drastically reduced the 
scope of their manifestos.2 The results overwhelmingly benefited the PS at the expense 
of the governing parties.3 
To explain these results, I propose an aggregate approach to studying issue 
salience. The theory focuses on the scope of attention across issues in election 
campaigns. I argue that issue diversity reflects a tradeoff between selectively 
emphasizing salient issues on which a party is favored versus defending their wider 
record in office (for a similar argument, see Vavrek 2009).4 Government parties 
reinforce, defend and respond to criticisms of their recent policy record on a broad 
range of issues. Opposition parties act less restrained by recent policy experiences. 
However, a strong economy allows governing parties to focus their policy message on a 
smaller number of issues such as their historical competencies. 
Like studies of issue competition (Petrocik 1996; Bélanger and Meguid 2008; 
Green and Hobolt 2008; Green 2011), I expect that parties use issues in their campaigns 
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to attract votes and that the demands placed on parties influence their policy messages 
(e.g. Somer-Topçu 2009; Vavrek 2009; Green 2011; Spoon 2011). Attention to issues 
reflects a balance of historical competencies and recent government experiences. Parties 
narrow their attention to emphasize policy competencies when they are confident in 
their ability to control their message; when they are in the opposition or when they 
expect to be rewarded for the economy in government. Government parties lacking 
confidence regarding their economic record, such as the RPR and UDF in 1997, increase 
the scope of their message to a broader number of issues. 
I examine the hypotheses using a measure of issue diversity LQSDUWLHV·
manifestos: the Effective Number of Manifesto Issues (ENMI). Like measures used to 
study government policy (Jennings et al. 2011), ENMI measures the mathematical 
GLYHUVLW\RILVVXHVLQSDUWLHV·FDPSDLJQV5 ENMI allows researchers to study concepts 
such as issue entrepreneurship and selective emphasis from a more general, aggregate 
perspective that avoids making strong claims about the specific issues parties address. 
This perspective encourages a comprehensive approach to the study of election 
priorities. Using data on 1662 manifestos from political parties in 24 OECD democracies 
from 1951 to 2010, I show that incumbent status and economic conditions predict 
SDUWLHV·(10, Through a series of additional analyses, I also demonstrate evidence to 
support the underlying mechanism. I find evidence that governing parties focus on 
economic and welfare state policies more when the economy performs well. I also show 
evidence for the underlying mechanism by predicting the specific issues governing 
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SDUWLHVDGGUHVVDVZHOODVJRYHUQPHQWV·SROLF\UHFRUGVIURPWKH&RPSDUDWLYH$JHQGDV
Project (CAP). The results from these analyses lend support to the theory of issue scope. 
To my knowledge, this is the first comparative study that examines the issue 
diversity in elections.6 TKHVFRSHRISDUWLHV·FDPSDLJQPHVVDJHVLVLPSRUWDQWWRVWXG\
for both theoretical and empirical reasons. As Ezrow (2007) notes, this approach allows 
researchers to expand the study of representation beyond its traditional focus on the 
location of preferences or issue emergence. Studying the distribution of attention on 
issues also likely holds implications for traditional theories of party election 
campaigns.7 For example, position taking on a new issue dimension will be less 
SURPLQHQWLIWKDWLVVXHLVRQO\RQHRIDODUJHQXPEHURIWRSLFVLQDSDUW\·VFDPSDLJQ
message. Empirically, issue diversity changes substantially between and within parties 
RYHUWLPHWKHVFRSHRISDUWLHV·SODWIRUPVWKHUHIRUHSURYLGHVDQHZPHDQVRIWHVWLQJ
theories of party behavior.  
A focus on the scope of campaigns facilitates integration of theories of election 
strategy and public policy outcomes. The current omission is striking as scholars of 
political communication, public policy, and government behavior increasingly consider 
the role of issue salience and diversity for a range of outcomes (e.g. Bनck et al. 2011; 
Jennings et al. 2011; Falcó-Gimeno 2012;  Greene and Jensen 2014; Meyer and Wagner 
2013; Boydstun et al. 2014; Wagner and Meyer 2014). The findings provide a broad 
explanation for party behavior and suggest potential strategies for electoral victory.  
 
 
 
6 
 
Scope, Competence and the Economy 
 
Studies of issue entrepreneurship, uptake and salience advance our knowledge 
of issue competition. While this research explains major components of issue 
FRPSHWLWLRQSDUWLHV·LVVXHDWWHQWLRQFDQEHVWXGLHGLQDPRUHJHQHUDOIUDPHZRUN)RU
example, by studying only broad issue dimensions researchers cannot explain changes 
across the range of topics or issues parties include in their campaigns.8 By focusing on 
the distribution, rather than a single or limited set of issues, a theory focused on 
aggregate diversity both complements and informs theories of issue attention, 
ownership and uptake. A general theory will explain how parties integrate multiple 
strategies simultaneously. Treating tactics as independent may lead researchers to miss 
contexts in which parties add or remove issues within the dominant issue dimension or 
add multiple issues on many possible dimensions.9 Why do parties expand or 
concentrate the scope of their attention on a large or small number of issues?  
I answer these questions by considering the contexts that lead parties to increase 
or decrease the scope of issues in their manifestos. Following studies of party 
preferences (e.g. Adams 1999; Adams and Somer-Topçu 2009; Green 2011; Ceron 2012), 
I assume that parties use manifestos to attract voters and mobilize intra-party groups. 
As strategic documents, parties include issues based on the ORFDWLRQRIYRWHUV·
preferences, SDUW\·VHOHFWRUDOQHHGVDQGSROLF\UHSXWDWLRQ (see for example Green 2011). 
In the hypothetical case in which a single party chooses the salient topics in an election, 
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a party would only address issues that maximize its votes or the likelihood of 
controlling office. Parties would only diversify appeals if they expected an electoral 
payoff. This perspective fits well both with spatial modeling accounts that parties 
would only make appeals on which they were ideologically close to voters (Green 2011) 
and also ZLWK.LUFKKHLPHU·VFRQFHSWRIWKHFDWFK-all party; parties extend the 
breadth of their appeals to attract the greatest number of voters.10  
The real world is more complex. Policy reputations confound campaign 
messages. Parties earn a reputation from experiences in government and the priorities 
of their historical electoral constituencies (Hibbs 1977; Budge and Farlie 1983; Green and 
Jennings 2011a and 2011b ; Egan 2013). Parties emphasize the issues in their electoral 
FDPSDLJQVRQZKLFKWKH\GHYHORSORQJWHUPSRVLWLYHDVVRFLDWLRQVRU¶RZQHUVKLS·LQWKH
HOHFWRUDWHHJ(JDQ+RZHYHUSDUWLHV·RZQHUVKLSLVUDUHO\FRPSOHWH and voters 
often disagree over party competence ratings (e.g. Bélanger and Meguid 2008)9RWHUV·
perceptions of competence closely relate to other important characteristics such as the 
ORFDWLRQRISDUWLHV·SUHIHUHQFHV:DJQHUDQG=HJORYLWV4). However, competence 
ratings moderate the effect of the economy on incumbent electoral performance (e.g. 
Martinsson 2009; Bélanger and Gélineau 2010). These ratings in turn depend on 
economic conditions (Green and Jennings 2011a and 2011b) and perceived ideological 
proximity (Vegetti 2014). Overall, this research indicates that reputations from 
government participation moderate SDUWLHV·strategies.  
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In government, parties must explain their recent policy record. Government 
policies often cover undesirable topics. Governing parties respond to opposition 
critiques and world events on a broad range of issues (Green-Pederson and Mortensen 
2010; Bawn and Somer-Topçu 2012). For example, opposition parties often use roll call 
votes and SDUOLDPHQWDU\GHEDWHVWRKLJKOLJKWWKHJRYHUQPHQW·VEHKDYLRUHJ&DUH\
2008; Kam 2009). Policy outputs, therefore, conVWUDLQSDUWLHV·DELOLW\WRVHOHFWLYHO\
construct a campaign message.11  
Opposition parties face fewer constraints because they have few tools to 
implement policy (Green-Pederson and Mortensen 2010). Lacking influence may have 
an upside. Opposition parties are freed from the obligation to govern responsibly. 
These parties selectively propose policies on issues that they believe benefit them 
without recent policy outputs affecting their reputation.  
I predict that parties focus on the issues they believe will attract the most votes in 
an election, but that government parties also sell, explain and defend their policy 
record. Incumbent parties that ignore their recent record would appear unresponsive 
and unaccountable to voters. Because governing parties develop policy on a broad 
range of issues (Green-Pederson and Mortensen 2010), I hypothesize that these parties 
distribute their attention to a larger number of issues, whereas opposition parties 
selectively address salient topics (such as the weak economy). Therefore, parties in the 
governing cabinet discuss a greater number of issues than their opposition 
counterparts.  This logic is summarized in the first hypothesis; 
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H1) Government parties will have greater issue diversity in their manifestos than 
opposition parties. 
 
Although policy reputations constrain governing parties, the quality of the policy 
output mediates their need to defend their record. TKHHFRQRP\LQIOXHQFHVYRWHUV·
perceptions of goverQLQJSDUWLHV· competencies. Green and Jennings (2011a and 2011b) 
VKRZWKDWJRYHUQLQJSDUWLHV·UHSXWDWLRQVDUHEXR\HGRQDUDQJHRILVVXHVXQGHUVWURQJ
economic growth. Voters frequently penalize or reward governments for economic 
conditions (e. Martinsson 2009; Vavrek 2009; Bélanger and Gélineau 2010; Hellwig 
2012). Like these studies, I assume that voter evaluations of the economy structure their 
perceptions of government and opposition parties. Given the prominence of economic 
voting and the dominance of the left-right dimension (Gabel and Huber 2000), I argue 
WKDWWKHVFRSHRISDUWLHV·FDPSDLJQVGHSHQGRQFXUUHQWHFRQRPLFFRQGLWLRQV8QGHUD
strong economy, government parties focus attention on issues underlying the left-right 
economic dimension. Governing parties use a healthy economy as an opportunity to 
reinforce their policy reputation on the most salient political issues. A strong economy 
liberates incumbents from the mundane or unpopular details of their policy record. It 
allows them to exclusively emphasize the socio-economic policies such as welfare 
policy and LQGLYLGXDOV·TXDOLW\RIOLIH.  
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However, governing parties seek to divert attention to other issues on which 
they enacted policy when the economy performs poorly.12 Vavreck (2009), for example, 
shows that US presidential candidates avoid discussing the economy when they might 
be punished for its poor success. As a result, incumbent parties avoid highlighting weak 
or negative economic conditions (Vavreck 2009; Hellwig 2012). Instead, governing 
parties redirect attention to alternate issues. This is not to argue that parties abandon 
economic issues. A governing party with a weak economy will just as likely be 
punished for appearing unresponsive. Parties seek to redirect debates and expand the 
scope RILVVXHVWRWRSLFVWKDWEHWWHUIDYRUWKHP7KHIROORZLQJK\SRWKHVLVOLQNVSDUWLHV·
participation in government and economic conditions to the scope of their campaigns. 
 
H2) Government parties will have less issue diversity in their manifestos when the 
economy performs well, but have greater issue diversity when the economy performs 
poorly. 
 
In summary, the theory of issue scope predicts that experiences in government 
DQGHFRQRPLFFRQGLWLRQVLQIOXHQFHSDUWLHV·FDPSDLJQPHVVDJHVWhen they are in office, 
pDUWLHV·campaigns include a broader range of issues to uphold their policy behaviors. 
However, they work to emphasize their reputation for competence by narrowing the 
manifesto to those issues when the economy is strong.  
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Data and Methods 
Scholars use a number of measures to study issue competition, such as the 
percentage of the manifesto on an issue or dummy variables to indicate new issues 
(Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996; Green and Jennings 2011a; de Vries and Hobolt 
2012).  However, there is no common measure of issue diversity.13 I propose a new 
dependent variable: ENMI. In particular, I test my theory using data on parties from 24 
OECD countries from 1951-2010. The sample includes each party and election from 
advanced industrial democracies for which there are available data from the 
Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) (Budge et al. 2001.; Klingemann et al. 2006 and 
Volkens et al. 2011), the Parliamentary and Government Composition Database (Döring 
and Manow 2010), and economic data from the OECD Statistical Database. The 
resulting sample of economic and electoral data includes 253 parties in 298 elections for 
1662 party-election year observations.14  
I operationalize the dependent variable, ENMI, using data from the CMP. Issue 
diversity is an important element of a campaign message. As a mathematical property, 
diversity measures the number of categories (such as issues) and the distribution of 
observations across those categories (such as the number of statements on each issue). A 
measure of issue diversity reflects the distribution of attention across those issues. 
Measures of entropy and diversity have increasingly been used in studies of policy 
agendas (see for example Jennings et al. 2011; Boydstun et al. 2014)15 because a simple 
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count cannot distinguish between differences in emphasis across issues. Therefore, I use 
issue diversity as my dependent variable. 
Additional complications arise because the CMP includes confrontational 
categories.16 Directly confrontational issues are those for which the CMP separately 
codes the statements that are positive and negative towards an issue, such as the 
FDWHJRULHV´0LOLWDU\3RVLWLYHµDQG´0LOLWDU\1HJDWLYH.µ17 To avoid over-counting 
diversity, I sum each of 14 the confrontational pairings identified by Lowe et al. (2011). 
These pairs measure the total percentage of the manifesto dedicated to each of the 14 
issues they reflect, regardless of ideological direction.18 I expect that treating 
confrontational codes as distinct would over-predict diversity for parties that balance 
their positive and negative statements on these issues.19 Thus, the percentage of the 
manifesto dedicated to each issue reflects its salience, not a left-right position. 
I use the percentage of the manifesto dedicated to each issue to measure the 
ENMI. Based on the original 56 categories, the maximum number of issues is 42, after 
summing the 14 issues.20 I then use a function of diversity commonly used in physics, 
economics, and political communication; this measure relates to the function frequently 
used to estimate the effective number of parties (ENP). Like Jennings et al. (2011) and 
BoydstuQHWDO,XVH6KDQQRQ·V+HQWURS\LQGH[WRHVWLPDWHWKHXQFHUWDLQW\WKDW
DWH[WUHIHUHQFHVDFDWHJRU\6KDQQRQ,WKHQWUDQVIRUP6KDQQRQ·s H into a 
measure of diversity: ENMI (see Jost 2006).21 6KDQQRQ·V+PRUHDFFXUDWHO\UHSUHVHQWV
the true distribution of topics or issue categories in a document than the traditional 
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measure of party diversity; the Herfindahl index on which the ENP measure is derived, 
GLVSURSRUWLRQDWHO\ZHLJKWVWKHODUJHVWFDWHJRULHVZKHUHDV6KDQQRQ·V+LVDWUXH
measure of entropy (see Jost 2006; Jennings et al 2011; Boydstun et al. 2014).  Therefore, 
the Herfindahl based index may under predict issue diversity when there is a 
particularly large category.22 The following shows the formula for ENMI where mi is 
the percentage of statements in the manifesto on an issue, i. 
݄ܵܽ݊݊݋݊ᇱݏܪ ൌ  െ ෍ ݉௜ሺ݉௜ሻସଶ௜ୀଵ  ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐ݅ݒ݁ܰݑܾ݉݁ݎ݋݂ܯ݂ܽ݊݅݁ݏݐ݋ܫݏݏݑ݁ݏ ൌ ሺ݄ܵܽ݊݊݋݊ᇱݏܪሻ  ? ൌ ሺെሺሺǤ ? ?ሻ ሺǤ  ? ?ሻሻ ൅ ሺሺǤ  ? ?ሻ ሺǤ  ? ?ሻሻ ǥ ൅ ሺሺ ? ? ?ሻ ሺ ? ? ?ሻሻሻ 
The third equation illustrates a manifesto that contains two statements on 
separate issues. This leads to an ENMI of 2. Higher values indicate less focus on a 
specific issue and distribution of attention across a greater number of issues. If the 
hypothetical party added a third sentence on a new issue, ENMI increases to 3. The 
SDUW\·VUHODWLYHIRFXVRQHDFKRIWKHILUVt two issues drops from 50% of its manifesto to 
DVWKHSDUW\·VPHVVDJHEURDGHQVWRLQFOXGHWKHQHZLVVXH3DUWLHVWKDWLQFUHDVH
their ENMI decrease their relative attention to any specific issue already included in the 
SDUW\·VPDQLIHVWRDVWKH\H[SDnd their attention to additional issues.23  
On average, parties have an ENMI of 16.6.  In the sample, the French Gaullist 
Party in 1962 has the maximum observed ENMI of 31.46.24 In 1999, the ultra-orthodox 
 
 
14 
 
religious Israeli Shas party had the smallest ENMI of 1.7.25  I present these descriptive 
statistics in the Appendix.  
<<<Figure 1 about here>>> 
Figure 1 shows ENMI by party family type.26 ENMI characterizes a number of 
important trends. As Przeworski and Sprague (1986) would expect, ENMI increases for 
socialist parties over time. Likewise, niche parties include fewer issues. Parties classified 
by the CMP as green emphasize 15.1 and nationalist parties 15.2 issues on average, 
compared to 17.3, 17.1, 16.4 and 16.9 issues for parties categorized as socialist, liberal, 
conservative and Christian democratic. These small differences illustrate Meyer and 
:DJQHU·V argument that the primary difference between niche and mainstream 
parties is the types of issues they address. ENMI generally increased over time for most 
SDUWLHV7KLVWUHQGLVFRQVLVWHQWZLWK.LUFKKHLPHU·Vcatch-all party theory in 
which parties reached out to wider voter groups over the course of the twentieth 
century.  
I test hypotheses using a multivariate model predicting ENMI. I operationalize 
the independent variables using sources on government composition and economic 
conditions. I measure government composition using the Parliamentary and 
Government Composition Database (Döring and Manow 2010) and use a dummy 
variable to measure whether the party was in the last non-caretaker cabinet prior to the 
current election.27 I then include an interaction between this incumbency variable and 
the percent GDP growth in the year of the election as measured by the OECD.28 29 
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Control variables also account for alternate explanations from issue entrepreneur and 
institutional logics.30  
I control for a number of traditional arguments related to issue salience and 
elections.  In particular, de Vries and Hobolt (2012) show that electoral losers and 
ideologically extreme parties on the primary issue dimension are more likely to include 
new issues on non-dominant dimensions. From their perspective, more ideologically 
extreme parties will be more likely to act as issue entrepreneurs. I roughly approximate 
this argument by constructing DPHDVXUHRIHDFKSDUW\·VDEVROXWHGLVWDQFHIURPWKH
average left-ULJKWSDUW\SRVLWLRQLQWKHFRXQWU\XVLQJ/RZHHWDO·VORJJHGYHUVLRQ
of the RILE scale (de Vries and Hobolt 2012).31 This measure represents the part\·V
absolute distance from the mean preferences in an election and not the location of its 
preferences.   
/LNHVWXGLHVRISDUW\FKDQJH,FRQWUROIRUSDUWLHV·SUHYLRXVHOHFWRUDOVXFFHVV
(Somer-Topcu 2009). I include the absolute change in the percentage vote each party 
received in the previous election and a dummy variable to indicate whether a party lost 
control of government or exited the cabinet following the last election. The average 
number of issues parties included in the last election tests whether parties respond to 
WKHLVVXHVLQWKHLUFRPSHWLWRUV·SODWIRUPV6LJHOPDQDQG%XHOO 
To account for the potential that large catch-all parties act differently than 
smaller parties, I measure the percentage of vote parties received in the last election. I 
expect that larger parties have more diverse platforms. A dummy variable for niche 
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parties indicates whether the party is a member of a traditionally niche party family 
(green, nationalist, or regional party) as coded by the CMP.  I include a number of 
controls for the effect of political institutions as dichotomous variables; institutions, 
VXFKDVVWDWHVWUXFWXUHDQGHOHFWLRQUXOHVOLNHO\LQIOXHQFHSDUWLHV·RUJDQL]DWLRQDO
strategies and the need to appeal to multiple political groups or focus their attention on 
a limited number of issues. Dummy variables account for federal institutions32 
(Filippov et al. 2004) and majoritarian elections (Farrell 2001). I expect that the presence 
RIHDFKRIWKHVHLQVWLWXWLRQVZLOOLQFUHDVHSDUWLHV·(10,LQWKRVHFRXQWULes.  
I examine the hypotheses using a multilevel model to account for the hierarchical 
data structure. Given my interest in party level data, I include random intercepts at the 
election and country levels to address unmeasured factors at these levels.33 I then 
present additional evidence in support for the underlying issue competence story. 
 
Analysis  
 
I argue that context influences the scope of SDUWLHV·PDQLIHVWRV7DEOHSUHVHQWV
the results from the primary analysis in a simple model and one that includes a number 
of control variables. 
  
<<<Table 1 about Here>>> 
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I predict WKDWSDUWLHV·JRYHUQPHQWVWDWXVDQGWKHHFRQRP\LQIOXHQFHSDUWLHV·
ENMI.  The results in Table 1 support the hypotheses. The coefficients for incumbent 
parties and the interaction with GDP Growth in both models are statistically significant 
and in the predicted directions. Consistent with first hypothesis, the positive and 
significant constitutive term for incumbent parties indicates that government parties 
include a larger diversity of issues in their manifestos than opposition parties. In 
general, government parties have a higher ENMI than opposition parties.34  
As predicted by H2, the coefficients for the interaction of incumbent parties and 
GDP growth in both models are negative and statistically significant at the 90% level in 
the simple model, but increases to the 95% level once controls are included. Incumbent 
parties have a larger ENMI, but governing parties decrease their ENMI under stronger 
economic growth. These results are broadly consistent with the theory; incumbent 
parties emphasize their reputation when they command a strong economy.  
 
<<<Figure 2 about here>>> 
 
Figure 2 presents the marginal effects of government incumbency and % GDP 
Growth. At low levels of GDP Growth, government parties clearly have a higher ENMI 
than opposition parties.35 Under high levels of GDP growth (greater than 5%) 
JRYHUQPHQWSDUWLHV·(10,GHFUHDVHVWROHYHOVFRPSDUDEOHWRRSSRVLWLRQSDUWLHV)LJXUH
2 illustrates that the incumbency effect is statistically significant for lower values of 
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GDP growth, but ENMI for incumbent and opposition parties converges at extremely 
high levels of economic growth.  
Overall, the results in Table 1 and Figure 2 are consistent with the theory. 
Governments include a higher ENMI when the economy is weak or shrinking, but 
reinforce their reputation when the economy is a strong positive influence, by 
narrowing their ENMI. Strong economic growth presumably frees the government to 
focus only on the issues it wants to emphasize.  
The control variables included in Table 1 also suggest that ENMI is a useful 
measure to study traditional theories of party strategy and issue competition. The 
coefficients suggest support for theories of election strategy emphasizing previous 
electoral volatility (Somer-Topçu 2009), party size (Wagner and Meyer 2014), electoral 
losers (de Vries and Hobolt 2012), and issue competition (Sigelman and Buell 2004). 
Parties with fewer votes and that changed their vote in the last election increased their 
ENMI. The effect is relatively small (as Harmel and Janda 1994 might predict).36 Parties 
that lost control of office in the last election also have higher ENMI. A party that lost 
control of government in the last election increases its ENMI by 1.1, a 7% increase 
relative to the mean. This result is consistent with a perspective in which electoral losers 
increase ENMI by acting as issue entrepreneurs (de Vries and Hobolt 2012). There is 
also HYLGHQFHWKDWSDUWLHVUHVSRQGWRWKHLVVXHVLQWKHLUFRPSHWLWRUV·HOHFWLRQFDPSDLJQV
(e.g. Meguid 2008; Green-Pederson and Mortensen 2010 and Spoon et al. 2014). The 
positive coefficient for average competitor ENMI indicates that parties respond to 
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FRPSHWLWRUV·ENMI. This result supports 6LJHOPDQDQG%XHOO·VILQGLQJof a large 
overlap in the issues in election campaigns in the United States.  
7KHUHODWLYHORFDWLRQRISDUWLHV·SUHIHUHQFHVDOVRPDWWHU7KHFRHIficient for 
ideological distance is negative. Ideologically extreme parties have a lower ENMI than 
more central parties, although the coefficient is not statistically different from zero. 
Issue entrepreneurs may substitute older issues with the new ones rather than tacking 
them on to their previous platforms. The coefficient for niche parties is negative, but 
never reaches statistical significance. 37  
The institutional controls perform mostly as expected. Institutions that increase 
the likelihood of intra-party divisions, such as federalism or majoritarian elections 
LQFUHDVHSDUWLHV·(10,'HVSLWHWKHVPDOOGHJUHHVRIIUHHGRPDWWKHFRXQWU\OHYHOWKH
coefficient for federalism is positive and statistically significant. Federal institutions 
increase parties·(10,E\RUQHDUO\UHODWLYHWRWKHPHDQ(10,/LNHZLVHWKH
coefficient for majoritarian institutions is positive, but not quite statistically different 
IURP]HUR7KHVHLQLWLDOUHVXOWVVXJJHVWDQHIIHFWRILQVWLWXWLRQVRQSDUWLHV·(10, 
 
Unpacking the Mechanism I: ENMI and Issue Emphasis 
 
The evidence for the hypotheses is consistent with the theory. However, the 
results in Table 1 leave the degree to which change in ENMI reflects the underlying 
mechanism unclear. I predict that parties select their messages to reinforce and build 
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perceptions of competence. To test this mechanism, I undertake two analyses.  I first 
IRFXVWKHDQDO\VLVRQHFRQRPLFFRQGLWLRQVDQGSDUWLHV·WUHDWPHQWRILVVXHVLQWKHLU
manifestos. This test demonstrates that economic conditions change the substance of 
JRYHUQPHQWSDUWLHV·FDPSDLJQs. I also present evidence on government policy from the 
CAP on a sample of single party governments in Canada, Spain and the United 
Kingdom. These results show that governing parties are bound to the breadth of their 
policy records unless the economy is doing well. Combined, the evidence is consistent 
with the broader theoretical approach and indicates strong support for the underlying 
mechanism.   
<<<Figure 3 About Here>>> 
The theory predicts that government parties decrease their ENMI as they focus 
attention on socio-economic issues under a growing economy. While the results show 
WKDWSDUWLHV·(10,GHFUHDVHVLQWKLVFRQWH[WWKHDJJUHJDWHGHYLGHQFHFDQQRWLQGLFate 
the type of issues.  Figure 3 presents the predicted bivariate relationship between 
SRVLWLYHHFRQRPLFJURZWKDQGWKH´(FRQRP\µDQGWKH´:HOIDUHDQG4XDOLW\RI/LIHµ
issue dimensions classified by the CMP. If parties favor socio-economic issues, these 
dimensions will be positively correlated with ENMI. Consistent with the logic behind 
H2, Figure 3 demonstrates that both dimensions positively correlate with GDP growth 
for incumbent parties. The other five dimensions negatively correlate with GDP growth, 
iQGLFDWLQJWKDWWKHGHFUHDVHLQJRYHUQPHQWSDUW\·V(10,LVOLQNHGWRWKHLQFUHDVHG
attention on socio-economic issues.  
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<<<TABLE 2 About HERE>>> 
 $VDPRUHULJRURXVH[DPLQDWLRQ,SUHGLFWWKHSHUFHQWDJHRIWKHSDUWLHV·
manifestos dedicated to the two economic dimensions in the CMP in Table 2 using the 
same predictors as in the analysis of ENMI. I separately predict each dimension in the 
first two models and then combine the dimensions in Model 5. I use a Tobit model with 
random effects to account for the censoring of the dependent variable at zero and one in 
Table 2. Like the relationships presented in Figure 3, these tests provide evidence 
consistent with the theory. 
If positive economic conditions lead government parties to emphasize issues 
related to socio-economic success, then the coefficients for the interaction of 
government incumbency and change in economic growth will be reversed relative to 
those predicting ENMI. Consistent with this perspective, the coefficients are in the 
expected direction across models and statistically significant at conventional levels for 
the results for both the Welfare dimension and the combined dimensions.   
8QVXUSULVLQJJLYHQWKHGLPHQVLRQ·VFRQWHQW38 the results in Table 2 are strongest 
for the Welfare dimension. The Economic dimension references the ideal organization 
of the economy and prescriptions for an ailing economy.39 The Welfare dimension 
includes discussion of the beneficiaries of economic growth through references to social 
services and social justice. The results show that a positive change in economic growth 
LQFUHDVHVWKHSHUFHQWDJHRISDUWLHV·PDQLIHVWRVGHGLFDWHGWRGLVFXVVLRQVRIWKH:HOIDUH
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state. Overall, this evidence demonstrates that economic growth leads parties to 
emphasize their economic competence.40 
 
Unpacking the Mechanism II: Policy Success and ENMI 
 
As a final test of the underlying mechanism, I combine this evidence with data 
from the CAP from three parliamentary democracies with strong, single-party, 
parliamentary governments: Canada (10 elections), Spain (5 elections) and the United 
Kingdom (13 elections).41 I have argued that economic conditions lead government 
parties to emphasize a limited subset of important topics or to draw attention to their 
broader policy agenda when the economy is weaker. From this perspective, incumbents 
draw greater attention to their broader policy records under weaker economic growth. 
Incumbents benefitting from stronger economic conditions will reduce the emphasis on 
their recent policy records. Stated differently, I predict that economic conditions 
moderate the relationship between their past policy records and their current 
manifestos. 
<<<TABLE 3 About HERE>>> 
In Table 3, I present evidence consistent with this perspective. I predict the 
LQFXPEHQWSDUW\·V(10,LQ each country using the effective number of policy issues 
(ENPI) based on primary legislation in the years since the last election. If this 
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perspective is correct, then ENPI will correlate more weakly ZLWKSDUWLHV·(10,ZKHQ
the economy is stronger, but correlate stronger under a weak economy.   
The results in Table 3 show support for the mechanism, despite the small sample. 
In particular, as the theory predicts, the ENPI is positively correlated with the ENMI, 
although the coefficient is not statistically significant. However, the interaction of ENPI 
and GDP growth is negative and statistically significant at the .1 level. As economic 
growth strengthens, predicted levels of ENMI decrease.42  
<<<Figure 4 About Here>>> 
Figure 4 shows the effect of GDP growth for high and low levels of ENPI.43 For 
both high and low levels of ENPI, the link between ENPI and ENMI is most direct for 
governments with weak economic growth. On the one hand, economic growth leads to 
increased ENMI for governments with low levels of ENPI. On the other hand, economic 
growth decreases ENMI when governments have higher ENPI. The clearest effect is for 
governments with high ENPI. At the highest levels of policy diversity, an increase in 
GDP growth of one percent leads to a decrease in partiHV·(10,RIDSSUR[LPDWHO\
issue or a 4% decrease from the mean number of issues in the subsample. Overall, this 
evidence is consistent with a story in which incumbent parties under a weak economy 
focus closely on their policy records, but are freed from their policy records under 
robust economic growth.  
 
Discussion 
 
 
24 
 
 In this study, I propose a theory oQWKHVFRSHRISDUWLHV·PDQLIHVWRV. I predict that 
WKHGLYHUVLW\RILVVXHVLQSDUWLHV·SODWIRUPVUHIOHFWVWKHLUHOHFWRUDOFRQWH[W2SSRVLWLRQ
parties address the issues they think will best serve them in the electorate whereas 
governing parties emphasize a larger number to reflect the policies they enacted in 
office. A positive economy allows governing parties the liberty to emphasize only their 
most rewarding achievements.  
I test hypotheses from the theory using a measure of issue diversity, ENMI. 
Based on 1662 observations from 24 OECD countries over a 60 year period, I find that 
WKHHOHFWRUDOFRQWH[WGHWHUPLQHVSDUWLHV·(10,*RYHUQPHQWSDUWLHVGLVWULEXWHtheir 
attention to a greater number of issues than opposition parties, but this difference 
dissolves under robust economic growth. I also find evidence consistent with the 
broader story through two analyses aimed at pinpointing the connection between 
goverQPHQWSROLF\UHFRUGVDQGLVVXHHPSKDVLVLQSDUWLHV·HOHFWLRQFDPSDLJQV,QWKH
first test, I find positive economic growth leads governing parties to focus primarily on 
topics related to welfare expansion and quality of life issues. Like Green (2011), this 
HYLGHQFHVXJJHVWVWKDWDQDUURZDSSHDOWRLVVXHVLPSRUWDQWWRSDUWLHV·FRQVWLWXHQFLHVLV
OLNHO\GHSHQGHQWRQWKRVHLVVXHV·EURDGHUHOHFWRUDODSSHDO Using a paired down data 
set from the CAP, I show through a second analysis that the diversity of governmeQWV·
policy records in office are more closely related to their manifestos when the economy is 
ZHDN:KHQWKHHFRQRP\LVVWURQJHUWKHFRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQLQFXPEHQWSDUWLHV·SDVW
legislative agendas and their manifestos reverses.  
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 These results help explain the behavior of the parties in the French 1997 election. 
The governing parties distributed their attention to a large total number of issues to 
defend their record in government. Freed from previous experiences in government five 
years prior, the opposition parties focused their platforms on a smaller number of 
issues. 
TKHFKRLFHRILVVXHVVLJQDOVWKHSDUW\·VH[SHFWDWLRQVIRUIXWXUHHOHFWRUDOVXFFHVV
Governing parties with fewer issues in their manifestos signal confidence in their 
performance on those issues. As the issue ownership perspective indicates (Petrocik 
1996; Egan 2013), parties focus attention on the issues that benefit them in the electorate, 
but only when conditions indicate that they will be viewed as competent. Government 
SDUWLHVFDQWKHQOLPLWWKHLUDSSHDOVWRWKRVHLVVXHVDQGH[SHFWWKDWYRWHUV·FRPSHWHQF\
ratings will spill over to other policy areas. Consistent with recent work on candidate 
DQGSDUWLHV·LVVXHDSSHDOVHJ9DYULNDQG+HOOZLJ 2012), I find that government 
SDUWLHV·DSSHDOVGHSHQGERWKRQWKHLUHFRQRPLFFRQWH[WDQGWKHLUSDVWSROLF\ agenda.   
The results also indicate that government parties which increase issue diversity 
signal decreased confidence in their record. A weak economy causes government 
parties to seek to distract voters from the economy. Like US Presidents (Vavrik 2009), 
governing parties avoid emphasizing poor economic performance. During a weak 
economy, parties emphasize their competence in government on a wider range of 
topics. By increasing the range of issues discussed, parties offer a greater diversity of 
choices to voters and provide the context for less salient issues to enter into the political 
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dialogue. Experience in government may also have the side effect of causing issue 
focused or niche parties to expand their appeal as they defend their policy records 
(Meyer and Wagner 2013). )URP6FKDWWVFKQHLGHU·VSHUVSHFWLYHWKLVLQFUHDVHG
choice likely promotes improved participation and democratic accountability.  
 The theory and findings offer a comprehensive framework to study the issues 
parties discuss in their election campaigns. These findings are only preliminary. 
Importantly, the primary independent variables leave substantial variation to be 
explained. The statistically significant effects for the random effects coefficients also 
imply numerous unexplained institutional and temporal components. Furthermore, the 
analyses of the causal mechanism only focus on a small number of issues and link to 
policy for a much smaller subsample of cases. More comprehensive analyses await 
IXUWKHUHYLGHQFHIRFXVHGRQSDUWLHV·LQWHUQDOGHFLVLRQ-making process.  
Finally, the evidence presented cannot demonstrate that the electoral scope has 
an electoral effect; under what conditions do parties benefit from increasing or 
decreasing the number of issues in their manifestos? The scope RILVVXHVLQSDUWLHV·
manifestos respond to the political and institutional context in a country, but this may 
have little impact oQSDUWLHV·HOHFWRUDOVXFFHVV7KHUHVXOWVLQGLFDWHWKDWWKHHIIHFWRI
SDUWLHV·FDPSDLJQWDFWLFVLVFRPSOH[DQGFRQGLWLRQDORQSDUWLHV·H[SHULHQFHVLQ
government. 
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Table 1. Multi-Level Analysis of ENMI. 
 (1) (2) 
 Simple Full 
Incumbent Party 
1.623*** 1.336*** 
(0.359) (0.401) 
Incumbent Party 
X % GDP Growth 
-0.136+ -0.171* 
(0.080) (0.084) 
%GDP Growth 
-0.120 0.000 
(0.101) (0.070) 
Percent Votet-1 
 0.041*** 
 (0.010) 
_Ʀ3HUFHQW9RWHt-
1| 
 0.052+ 
 (0.027) 
Lost control of 
governmentt-1 
 1.123** 
 (0.351) 
Ideological 
Distance 
 -0.317 
 (0.302) 
Mean Country 
ENMIt-1 
 0.558*** 
 (0.039) 
Niche Party  -0.158 
  (0.269) 
Majoritarian 
Elections 
 0.385 
 (0.455) 
Federalism 
 0.632+ 
 (0.379) 
Constant 16.966*** 6.133*** 
 (0.405) (0.661) 
Random Effects   
sd(Election) 0.580 0.000 
 (4.312) (0.001) 
sd(Country) 4.121*** 2.261*** 
 (0.635) (0.375) 
sd(Residual) 3.924*** 4.069*** 
 (0.097) (0.239) ɖଶ 27.122 441.564 
Log-Likelihood -4918.427 -4835.480 
Observations 1662 1662 
Note: The dependent variable is the Effective Number of Issues. Robust standard errors 
from a mixed effects OLS random intercept model are reported in parentheses. The 
results include a dummy variable to account for extreme values of GDP growth. All 
significance tests are two tailed: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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7DEOH5DQGRP(IIHFW7RELW$QDO\VLVRI3DUWLHV·&RUH,VVXH'RPDLQV 
 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 µ(FRQRPLFµ  ´:HOIDUHµ  
Combined 
    
Incumbent Party 0.005 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) 
Incumbent Party X % 
GDP Growth 
0.001 0.004* 0.005+ 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
%GDP Growth -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Percent Votet-1 0.001*** -0.000 0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
_Ʀ Percent Votet-1| -0.001 -0.002** -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Lost control of 
governmentt-1 
0.008 0.018* 0.024* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) 
Ideological Distance 0.011 0.008 0.020* 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Mean Country ENt-1 -0.000 0.003*** 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Niche Party -0.025* 0.034* 0.009 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.017) 
Majoritarian Elections 0.009 -0.040** -0.030 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.019) 
Federalism 0.010 -0.036** -0.026 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.017) 
Constant 0.216*** 0.194*** 0.414*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.021) 
Random Effect    
Party 0.070*** 0.086*** 0.105*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) ɖଶ 36.528 54.949 42.421 
Log-Likelihood 1267.737 1343.192 1016.694 
Observations 1662 1662 1662 
1RWH7KHGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHLVWKHSHUFHQWRIWKHSDUW\·VPDQLIHVWRGHGLFDWHGWRWKH
´(FRQRPLFµGRPDLQLQ0RGHO´:HOIDUHDQG4XDOLW\RI/LIHµGRPDLQLQ0RGHODQG
the sum of those categories in Model 5. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. The results include a dummy variable to account for extreme values of 
GDP growth. All significance tests are two tailed: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 
 
 
29 
 
0.001. 
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Table 3. OLS analysis of ENMI from ENPI. 
 Model 6 
  
E N P I 
0.670 
(0.569) 
GDP Growth 
0.183+ 
(0.106) 
E N P I  X GDP 
Growth 
-0.280+ 
(0.163) 
Constant 
0.058 
(0.367) 
Root Mean Squared 
Error 
0.087 
Log-Likelihood 32.170 
Observations 28 
Note: The dependent variable is the Effective Number of Manifesto Issues and the main 
independent variable, ENPI, is the Effective Number of Policy Issues addressed by 
parliament since the last election. Model 6 presents OLS estimates with fixed effects for 
the country year. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  All significance tests are 
two tailed: + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 2. Marginal Effect of GDP Growth on ENMI with 90% Confidence Intervals.44  
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Figure 3. Effect of Economic Growth on Economic and Welfare Issue Dimensions. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Effect of Economic Growth on ENPI to ENMI conversion.45 
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Appendix 
Descriptive Statistics  
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum 
Maximu
m 
Count 
ENMI 16.61 5.814 1.698 31.46 1662 
Incumbent 
Party 
0.304 0.460 0 1 1662 
%GDP Growth 3.019 2.735 -6.000 13.57 1662 
Percent Votet-1 16.76 14.62 0 57.71 1662 
_ǻ3HUFHQW
Votet-1| 
3.404 4.929 0 57.56 1662 
Lost control of 
governmentt-1 
0.110 0.312 0 1 1662 
Ideological 
Distance 
0.465 0.384 0.000178 2.314 1662 
Mean Country 
ENt-1 
16.46 4.540 4.972 27.92 1662 
Niche Party 0.285 0.451 0 1 1662 
Majoritarian 
Elections 
0.177 0.382 0 1 1662 
Federalism 0.295 0.456 0 1 1662 
N 1662     
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Footnotes 
 
1 $OWKRXJKWKHPDQLIHVWRQRORQJHULQFOXGHGVWDWHPHQWVIURPWKH535·VSODWIRUPRQ
issues such as corruption, government authority, the free market and the national way of life, 
the total number of issues remained quite high. The joint manifesto included statements 
GHIHQGLQJWKHJRYHUQLQJSDUWLHV·SULRULWLHVRQWRSLFVVXFKDVIRUHLJQVSHFLDOUHODWLRQVKLSVSHDFH
and the European community; the UDF had not included statements on these issues in the last 
election. 
2 These parties removed statements on a wide range of issues such as government 
centralization, administrative efficiency, labor unions and constitutionalism (Klingemann et al. 
2006).   
3 I selected the French case as an illustration of the theory following the broad logic of a nested 
analysis (Lieberman 2005).  
4 ,QWHUPVRIDEVROXWHOHQJWKSDUWLHV·PDQLIHVWRVDUHWKHRUHWLFDOO\XQOLPLWHGDOORZLQJSDUWLHVWR
fully address as many issues as they like. By focusing on the relative attention given to each 
issue (the percentage), the inclusion of additional sentences to new issues mechanically reduces 
the percentage of statements to the topics already included in the platform. From a relative 
salience perspective, the inclusion of increasing diversity reduces the salience of a topic unless 
additiRQDOVWDWHPHQWVDUHDGGHGWRLQFUHDVHWKDWWRSLF·VVDOLHQFHDVZHOO 
5 Following Jennings et al. (2011), I define issue diversity as the distribution of attention across 
the total range of topics. Issue diversity indicates the total number of issues and relative weight 
a party gives to each issue. Diversity is an aggregate characteristic that refers to the overall 
FRQFHQWUDWLRQRISDUWLHV·SROLF\PHVVDJHRQDVLQJOHRUZLGHUDQJHRILVVXHV 
6 Nyblade (2004) considers the use of a similar indicator to measure dimensionality. Stoll (2011) 
uses multiple approaches to predict the number of legislative parties in a country. Both Nyblade 
and Stoll use dimensionality as an independent variable. 
7 7KHVFRSHRILVVXHVLQSDUWLHV·SODWIRUPVDOVROLNHO\KROGVLPSOLFDWions for the votes parties 
receive in an election (the Pearson Correlation Coefficient for percent votes and ENMI is .2). For 
a fuller discussion of this relationship see Greene (2014). 
8 TKHQXPEHURILVVXHVDQGWKHQXPEHURIGLPHQVLRQVKDYHD3HDUVRQ·VCorrelation Coefficient 
of .766. Although the two measures clearly relate, parties may choose to add or remove issues 
within or across issue dimensions. See the Online Appendix for additional discussion of the 
relationship between dimensions and diversity.  
9 Following /LSVHWDQG5RNNDQ·VDSSURDFKVWXGLHVRIHQWUHSUHQHXUVKLSWUHDWLVVXHVDWthe 
level of tKHLVVXHGLPHQVLRQ)RUH[DPSOH&DUPLQHVDQG6WLPVRQVWXG\´SROLF\GHEDWHV«>WKDW@
PRYHIURPWKHOLPLWHG¶SROLF\·HQYLURQPHQWWRWKHODUJHUVWDJHRISDUWLVDQSROLWLFV«µ
902). Individual topics, such as unemployment or inflation, fit within issue dimensions so long 
as they complement or break with disagreements between political elites (Carmines and 
Stimson 1986; de Vries and Hobolt 2012).  
I define an issue as a topic below the level of the ideological dimension. Building on 
%XGJH·VDSSURDFK,GHILQHDQLVVXHDV´DSRLQWRUWRSLFHPSKDVL]HGE\µDSDUW\IRUWKH
SXUSRVHRI´GHILQLQJSDUW\VXSSRUWDPRQJHOHFWRUVµRU´PRYLQJVXSSRUWEHWZHHQWKHSDUWLHVµ
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(43). An ideological dimension is a broader category consisting of a group of issues or topics on 
which parties or the public concurrently disagree. Broader divisions like those discussed by 
Lipset and Rokkan (1967), are the way in which actors organize groups of issues into a broader 
framework. This paper focuses on the diversity or scope of topics. This approach allows the 
analysis to focus on the changes in attention given to issues within and orthogonal to the 
dominant cleavages.  
10 IsVXHGLYHUVLW\PD\DOVRSOD\DNH\UROHLQGLVWLQJXLVKLQJEHWZHHQ¶QLFKH·DQGFDWFK-all 
SDUWLHVHJ0H\HUDQG:DJQHU· 2013). 
11 See Nadeau et al. (2010) for an example of how incumbents may be able to instead selectively 
reframe the debate to benefit the party ZKHQWKHLUSUHIHUHQFHVDUHUHODWLYHO\FORVHWRWKHYRWHUV·
on that issue.  
12 $VLPLODUORJLFXQGHUOLHVSRSXODUPHGLDUHSRUWVZKLFKGHVFULEHSDUWLHV·HIIRUWVWRGLVFXVVWKH
HFRQRP\7DNHIRUH[DPSOH-DPHV&DUYLOOH·VRIWHQUHSHDWHGTXRWH´>,W·V@7KH(FRQRP\
6WXSLGµZKLFKZDV intended as a reminder for Bill Clinton to remind voters of the poorly 
performing economy in 1992. 
13 )RUDVLPLODUPHDVXUHIRUWKHGLPHQVLRQDOLW\RISDUWLHV·SODWIRUPVVHH1\EODGHDQG
Stoll (2011), and for political communication and policy agendas see Jennings et al. (2011) and 
Boydstun et al. (2014). 
14 The start date is determined by the availability of economic data.  I also limit the sample to 
parties with multiple time series observations because lagged variables require parties to have 
competed in multiple consecutive elections. The sample includes parties from Australia (1961-
2007), Austria (1962- 2002), Belgium (1961-2003), Canada (1962-2006),  Denmark (1964-2007), 
Finland (1962-2003), France (1951-2007), Germany (1972-2009), Greece (1977-2000), Iceland 
(1963-2003), Ireland (1973-2007), Israel (1961-1999), Italy (1963-2006), Japan (1963- 2003), 
Luxembourg (1964-1999), the Netherlands (1963-2003), New Zealand (1972-2008), Norway 
(1961-2001), Portugal (1976-2009), Spain (1979-2008), Sweden (1952-2010), Switzerland (1983-
2003), the United Kingdom (1964-2010), and the United States (1964-2008).  
15 The often used measure for the effective number of parties from Laakso and Taagepera is a 
diversity index derived from a measure of entropy, the Herfindahl index (Jost 2006).  
16 As noted by Lowe et al. (2011), there are number of issues without naturally opposing 
positional categories. For example, comments about the environment, positive or negative, are 
included under one category. Previous analyses seek to pair valence issues with alternate 
categories that may reflect a similar dynamic, such as pro-growth business to counter 
environmental policy (Meguid 2008). 
17 For example, the exact coding for the military separates statements into two categories. 
´0LOLWDU\3RVLWLYH1HHGWRPDLQWDLQRULQFUHDVHPLOLWDU\Hxpenditure; modernising armed 
forces and improvement in military strength; rearmament and self-defence; need to keep 
PLOLWDU\WUHDW\REOLJDWLRQVQHHGWRVHFXUHDGHTXDWHPDQSRZHULQWKHPLOLWDU\µ$QG´0LOLWDU\
Negative Favourable mentions of decreasing mLOLWDU\H[SHQGLWXUHVGLVDUPDPHQW´HYLOVRI
ZDUµSURPLVHVWRUHGXFHFRQVFULSWLRQRWKHUZLVHDVEXWQHJDWLYHµ 
18 Like Lowe et al. (2011) I consider the 14 confrontational codes in the CMP to include the 
IROORZFDWHJRULHV´)RUHLJQ6SHFLDO5HODWLRQVKLSVSRVLWLYHµDQG´)RUHLJQ6SHFLDO
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5HODWLRQVKLSVQHJDWLYHµ´0LOLWDU\SRVLWLYHµDQG´0LOLWDU\QHJDWLYHµ´,QWHUQDWLRQDOLVP
SRVLWLYHµDQG´,QWHUQDWLRQDOLVPQHJDWLYHµ´(XURSHDQ&RPPXQLW\SRVLWLYHµDQG´(XURSHDQ
&RPPXQLW\QHJDWLYHµ´&RQVWLWXWLRQDOLVPSRVLWLYHµDQG´&RQVWLWXWLRQDOLVPQHJDWLYHµ
´'HFHQWUDOLVDWLRQµDQG´&HQWUDOLVDWLRQµ´3URWHFWLRQLVP3RVLWLYHµDQG´3URWHFWLRQLVP
QHJDWLYHµ´:HOIDUH6WDWH([SDQVLRQµDQG´:HOIDUH6WDWH/LPLWDWLRQµ´(GXFDWLRQ
([SDQVLRQµDQG´(GXFDWLRQ/LPLWDWLRQµ´1DWLRQDO:D\RI/LIHSRVLWLYHµDQG´1DWLRQDO
:D\RI/LIHQHJDWLYHµ´7UDGLWLRQDO0RUDOLW\SRVLWLYHµDQG´7UDGLWLRQDO0RUDOLW\
QHJDWLYHµ´0XOWLFXOWXUDOLVPSRVLWLYHµDQG´0XOWLFXOWXUDOLVPQHJDWLYHµ´/DERXU
GrRXSVSRVLWLYHµDQG´/DERXU*URXSVQHJDWLYHµDQGODVWO\´.H\QHVLDQ'HPDQG
0DQDJHPHQW3RVLWLYHµDQG´(FRQRPLF2UWKRGR[\3RVLWLYHµ 
19 Alternate methods might be to measure the number of issue dimensions (like Stoll 2011) or to 
use a predefined set RI´LPSRUWDQWµcategories (such as Bनck et al. 2011). Other criticisms focus 
on the proliferation of economic codes in the CMP. Robustness checks following these alternate 
approaches and also using the effective number of non-economic issues leads to similar results 
and are reported in the Online Appendix, although the coefficients and the key independent 
variables do not always reach standard levels of significance. 
20 Numerous studies indicate problems with the CMP coding scheme. I account for these issues 
in a number of ways. For details regarding these changes, see the Online Appendix. 
21 Like analyses of policy diversity and entropy, I replace ln(0) as equal to zero (Jennings et al. 
2011). 
22 /DDNVRDQG7DDJHSHUD·V(13PHDVXUHWKH+HUILQGDKOLQGH[, is also a transformation of a 
measure of entropy. Both measure diversity and are easy to compute. The difference is that 
6KDQQRQ·VLQGH[ZHLJKVDOOFDWHJRULHVHTXDOO\ZKHUHDVWKH+HUILQGDKl index 
disproportionately favors the most common categories. The measures highly correlate with a 
coefficient of .975 and lead to substantively similar results.  
23 For additional information on the tradeoff between adding new issues and issue diversity, 
see the Online Appendix. 
24 The Gaullist party in 1962 (Union pour la Nouvelle République) discussed a wide range of goals 
for the newly established French Fifth Republic. Out of 374 coded sentence arguments, the 
Gaullist party discussed 40 issue categories, dedicating over 5% of the manifesto to only two 
WRSLFV´'HPRFUDF\µDQG´3ROLWLFDO$XWKRULW\µDQGUHVSHFWLYHO\ 
25 7KH6KDVSDUW\LQLQFOXGHGDSSUR[LPDWHO\RILWVPDQLIHVWRRQ´7UDGLWLRQDO
0RUDOLW\µDQGRQ´3HDFHµ 
26 In Figure 1, ENMI is smoothed using Lowess.  
27 For the only non-parliamentary country in the sample, the United States, I treat the party of 
the president as the incumbent government. 
28 To account for a small number of extreme values of GDP growth that may be driving the 
results of the analysis, I include a dummy variable to account for GDP outliers in the 99 
percentile of growth. The results are robust to its exclusion in all models, although the 
interaction of incumbent parties and economic growth just barely drops below the 95% 
significance level (p-value = .051) in Model 2.  
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29 To allow for the disposition effect observed by .DSSH·VVWXG\RIHFRQRPLFYRWLQJ, I 
separate GDP growth into two variables as a robustness check; one variable that only includes 
positive values and one that only includes negative values. The results are consistent with those 
presented and suggest a stronger effect from positive economic growth.  
30 For a detailed discussion of the controls see the Online Appendix. 
31 For more information on the RILE debate, see Lowe et al. (2011). The results are nearly 
LGHQWLFDOWRWKRVHXVLQJWKH&03·VWUDGLWLRQDOOHIW-right scale. 
32 I treat Spain as a federal country because of the high level of autonomy granted to each 
region.  
33 I reran the analysis using a random effects Tobit model and OLS with clustered standard 
errors for the election, a lagged dependent variable and fixed effects for the country level. The 
results are largely similar to the reported results, although none of the institutional variables are 
statistically significant using fixed effects with OLS. A Fisher type test for the full sample and 
for each country shows evidence consistent with the perspective that panels are stationary in 
the large majority of countries. Robustness checks using a Vector Autoregressive Error 
Correction Model with panel corrected standard errors and treating for panel level specific AR1 
autocorrelation indicate a short term effect of incumbency and a long term effect of GDP 
Growth for incumbents. 
34 Qualitative evidence from government party platforms also supports the logic behind H1.  
For example, the French Parti Socialiste prior to the 1993 election dedicated the first half page 
(approximately 25% of the words) of their manifesto to briefly touching on a large range of 
WRSLFVDVDGHIHQVHRIWKHSDUW\·VSROLF\VXFFHVVHVLQRIILFH7KHVHWRSLFVLQFOXGHGIRUHLJQWUDGH
inflation, household income, equality of sexes, retirement age, paid sick leave, the minimum 
wage, industry, television and radio communication, cultural programming, education, youth 
employment, decentralization, the death penalty, the police force, poverty, corruption, the 
European Community, and human rights.  Their platform was quite diverse including an ENMI 
of 24.5, 1.3 standard deviations above the mean value.  The combined RPR, UDF manifesto also 
included numerous references to their policy activities in 1997 when the economy was mildly 
positive. Their 1997 platform began with a short paragraph discussing their success at 
stabilizing the economy.  They only discuss a small number of economy related topics in this 
paragraph: mentioning positive economic growth and unemployment levels directly.   
35 Wald tests of the joint significance of the coefficients for government incumbency and its 
interaction with GDP growth are jointly significant at the 99.9% level. The coefficients for GDP 
growth and its interaction with government incumbency are jointly significant at 90% level.  All 
three coefficients are jointly different from zero at the 99% level.  
36 For every percentage change in vote between elections, a party increases ENMI by .05, a .03 
percent increase relative the mean value. These results hold when either controlling or 
excluding those extreme values of electoral volatility two standard deviations above the mean 
value.  
37 The lack of support for this variable may indicate that small parties consider different 
election strategies than larger mainstream parties (Spoon 2011). Including a control variable for 
green, nationalist, ethnic and communist parties has no substantive impact on the results; the 
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coefficient is negative, but never statistically different from zero.  As an alternate test, I also 
reran the analysis with an interaction between ideological distance and the lagged percentage 
vote. The interaction is positive, but not quite statistically significant at the .1 confidence level. 
The constitutive term for ideological distance is negative and not significant. The constitutive 
term for the percentage vote is still positive and significant. In an analysis that excludes the 
lagged percentage vote, ideological disagreement is also negative and not significant. While 
there is likely a relationship between party size, preferences and issue diversity, more 
conclusive results await future analysis.  
38 The Welfare Dimension includes mentions of Welfare Expansion (504) or Limitation (505) 
and Social Justice (503) as well as some less directly related issues (Education, Culture and 
Environment). Although at face value social justice might not immediately relate, but it includes 
WRSLFVRQWKH´&RQFHSWRIHTXDOLW\«QHHGIRUIDLUGLVWULEXWLRQRIUHVRXUFHVUHPRYDORIFODVV
EDUULHUV«µS$SSHQGL[&032YHUDOOWKHVHWRSLFVUHODWHPRUHFORVHO\WRWKHSUDFWLFDO
administration of the economy and perceptions of competence rather than its ideal 
organization.  
39 While the Economic dimension includes a number of topics parties might use to address 
their competencies, it mostly includes discussion of prescriptions for an ailing economy as well 
as more esoteric topics.  Topics in the Economic dimension largely relate to the theoretical 
organization of the economy and less to immediate economic experiences. This dimension 
includes Free enterprise (401), Economic incentives (402), market regulation (403), economic 
planning (404), corporatism (405), protectionism (406 and 407), economic goals (408), Keynesian 
demand management (409), productivity (410), technology and infrastructure (411), controlled 
economy (412), nationalization (413), economic orthodoxy (414), Marxist analysis (415), anti-
growth economy (416). 
40 Analysis of the other issue domains reveals that a tradeoff occurs between foreign policy 
versus welfare dimensions. When the economy is strong, incumbents emphasize their core 
economic policies, but thH\GUDZJUHDWHUDWWHQWLRQWRWRSLFVLQWKHILUVWGRPDLQ´([WHUQDO
Relations,µZKHQWKHHFRQRP\LVZHDNHU 
41 I combined data from Canadian (1972-2004), Spanish (1986-2008) and the UK (1964-2010) 
$JHQGD3URMHFWVIURPHDFKJURXS·VSXEOLFDOO\DYDLODEOHRQOLQe data. For each country, I 
construct a measure of the Effective Number of Policy Issues (ENPI) between elections by 
VXPPLQJWKHWRWDOQXPEHURISROLFLHVEDVHGRQHHDFKRIWKH&$3·VPDMRUWRSLFVFRGHV
Estimates in Table 3 are from an OLS model predicting the ENMI using fixed effects for the 
party and year. These cases provide a clean, but difficult test of the theory. Governments in each 
of these countries tend to contain only a single party and have few additional institutional 
bodies that confuse the clarity of responsibility for government policy. Therefore, the link 
EHWZHHQJRYHUQPHQWV·SROLF\DJHQGDVDQGWKHLUHOHFWLRQFDPSDLJQVVKRXOGEHVWURQJHVWLQWKHVH
VWURQJSDUOLDPHQWDU\GHPRFUDFLHV)XWXUHDQDO\VHVOLQNLQJJRYHUQPHQWV·SROLF\DJHQGDVWR
election campaigns will require additional focus on the role of coalition governance and 
accountability.  
   
The data for each country comes from the following sources:   
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Canada - http://www.snsoroka.com/data.html, (Accessed April 25, 2014). From Soroka and 
Wlezien (2009). 
 
Spain - http://www.ub.edu/spanishpolicyagendas/datasetinstruments/, (Accessed April 25, 
2014). From Chaqués-Bonafont et al. (2014). 
 
UK http://policyagendasuk.wordpress.com/datasets/, (Accessed April 25, 2014). From John et 
al. (2014). 
42 The coefficients for GDP growth and the interaction with ENPI are jointly significant at the .1 
level based on a Wald test.   
43 The two predicted marginal effects graphs in Figure 4 are for governments at the highest 
(.74) and lowest (.46) values of ENPI in the sample.  The negative effect of GDP growth is barely 
significant at the .1 level and only at the highest levels of ENPI, policy diversity.  
44 Figure 2 shows the marginal effect of GDP growth on opposition and incumbent government 
ENMI with 95 percent confidence intervals based on the results in Model 2, Table 1. The 
marginal effect for GDP growth is significant at the 90% level for incumbent parties. The solid 
line with dark confidence intervals is the marginal effect for the opposition and dashed line 
with light grey confidence intervals is for government parties. Dashes at the bottom illustrate 
observed distribution of GDP growth from two standard deviations below to two deviations 
above mean growth.  
45 Figure 4 shows the marginal effect of GDP growth on government ENMI with 90 percent 
confidence intervals based on the results in Model 6, Table 3. The marginal effect for GDP 
growth is significant at the 90% level for governments which addressed policy on a diverse set 
of issues. Dashes at the bottom illustrate observed distribution of GDP growth. 
